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Abstract
This article examines the relationship between reasoning and language in critical pedagogy, which is quite curiously left unspecified by many critical 
theorists, who relegate to a singularity: “language-thought.”  Exploring that lan-
guage-thought relationship reveals that the exercise of language is not enough to 
constitute thinking.  Rather, thinking emerges only  through self-aware meaning-
making.  The crux is that neither self-awareness nor meaning-making emerges 
unless words construct change.  
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MEANING MAKING AND MAKING MEANING  
MEANINGFUL
Beginning with Paulo Freire’s (1987) seminal condemnation of traditional 
“banking” pedagogies in which “the teacher thinks and the students are thought 
about” (p. 54), critical theorists have sought liberating pedagogies founded in 
the belief that teachers must encourage students to reason about their world, 
i.e. not be “thought about.”  The individual’s critical engagement of the world 
through thinking and language not only motivates “problem posing” education, 
but equally other critical mainstays such as conscientizacao—the understanding of 
social position and cultural forces—and praxis—the harmonization of thinking, 
naming, and action.  As such, it will come as no shock to those familiar with criti-
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cal theory that it holds cultivating the individual’s capacity to reason about the 
world as a primary objective.  
 What is curious, if not outright ironic, about critical pedagogy’s fervency 
for reasoning is that critical theorists largely leave “reasoning” undefined.  While 
we find ample allusions to the importance of reasoning capacity in nearly all writ-
ings on critical theory, a precise understanding of reasoning in the critical para-
digm remains elusive.  For example, when Freire writes that “authentic thinking, 
thinking that is concerned about reality, does not take place in ivory tower isola-
tion, but only in communication” (1987, p. 58), he makes a valuable point about 
how thinking must be dialogic, but “thinking” as the cognitive action remains 
nebulous.  
To a certain degree, it seems unfair to critique critical pedagogy for failing 
to define within its context something so difficult to define in any context.  Yet 
if reasoning is to be valued (and it should be), it certainly needs to be defined. 
In fact, the absence of its definition only enables critiques of critical theory from 
theorists (Hairston, 1992; McComiskey, 1993) who see it as primarily concerned 
with a political agenda rather than an educational one.  That said, this inquiry 
does not concern itself with the critiques of critical pedagogy’s stance but rather 
with understanding how critical theory defines reasoning.  While I hope doing 
so dispels assertions that critical theory is merely a political pedagogy, the greater 
value will be understanding what “thinking” we should strive for when teaching 
(critically or not).  
 Though an unusual thing to do at the relative beginning of a piece, I’m 
going to start with the answer to the question and define thinking in the critical 
context.  Back in 1981, Ann Berthoff (1981) actually offered a fairly succinct 
account of how critical theory defines reasoning, herein referred to as “critical 
awareness”:  
Critical awareness is consciousness of consciousness (a name for the active 
mind).  Minding the mind, being conscious of consciousness, is not the 
same sort of thing as thinking about your elbows when you’re about to 
pitch a baseball; nor is it self-consciousness.  Consciousness in meaning-
making activity always involves us in interpreting our interpretations; 
thinking is a matter of “arranging our techniques of arranging”; criticism 
is a matter of coming to “Know our knowledge.” (p. 44)
But what does “consciousness of consciousness” mean?  And if we understand 
what it means, why is it so important?  Though succinct in itself, and though 
surrounded by some additional discussion, fully decrypting what “consciousness 
of consciousness” means requires a more Frankensteinian collection of fragments 
from other critical pedagogues.
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Critical Thinking Emerges through a Linguistic Social Construction
 What’s clear from the outset is that critical pedagogues view reasoning 
not from a positivist perspective but rather as occurring within a socially con-
structed reality, with language serving as a means of creating the world rather than 
a means of “knowing” it.  As Giroux and McLaren (1992) explain it, 
… language constitutes reality rather than merely reflecting it.  Language 
… is not conceptualized as a transparent window to the world but rather 
as a symbolic medium that actively shapes and transforms the world.  
That is, language is the primary medium through which social identities 
are constructed, collective agents are formed, cultural hegemony secured, 
and emancipatory practice both named and acted upon. (p. 12)
Thus, Giroux and McLaren, and other critical pedagogues (Freire, 1987; 
Shor, 1992; Frankenstein, 1992; Wardekker & Miedema, 1997) attribute to lan-
guage an all-encompassing power, one that not only interacts with the world and 
constructs our identities within it but one that also establishes our hegemonic 
place within that world.  Language not only governs our interaction with the 
world from a personal perspective, i.e. how we perceive it, it also governs our posi-
tion relative to other power structures and linguistic constructs.
 So powerful, then, is language’s role in Giroux and McLaren’s critical 
conception that they authors reject the notion that an identifiable self can exist 
outside of language use.  While Giroux and McLaren (1992) concede a physi-
cal existence exists as part of a “non-discursive world outside of language” (p. 
14), they assert that “language helps us constitute subjectivity, which is often 
constructed out of a multiplicity of subjective positions … [and is] distinct from 
identity because … [the] term ‘identity’ … implies that there is a fixed essence 
that exists independently of the range of discourses made available to individu-
als” (p. 14).  Thus, while Giroux and McLaren concede a material reality, they 
contend that no “self ” can exist outside the language construct; they embrace 
linguistic subjectivity but deny non-linguistic identity.
 Since the self is subjective emergence of language, it fluctuates according 
to circumstance.  As Giroux and McLaren (2012) put it, we have “an individual 
presence without essence” (p. 14).  That “individual presence” does exist but we 
cannot possibly identify existence’s nature without naming it, and that act of 
naming it makes it both subjective and linguistic.  Therefore, thinking and the 
thinking self emerge only through language.  But a problem emerges: If the self 
exists only as a subjective linguistic construct, and therefore only as a relative one, 
how does that “individual presence without essence” achieve the act of reasoning?
 We can begin to discern the way such a subjective “self ” reasons by exam-
ining how critical theory treats that self pedagogically.  If there can be no self aside 
from its linguistic construction, there also can be no ontological external reality 
aside from its relation to that self because, as Giroux and McLaren point out, all 
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conceptions of reality are governed by naming.  Therefore, as Susan Gabel (2002) 
remarks, critical pedagogy 
must not conceptualize the subject.  The [student] subject should not be 
preformed as belonging to a particular race, or sexuality, or (dis)ability, 
or class prior to the pedagogical relationship.  Rather, the pedagogical 
subjects [emphasis added] (teacher and student) must emerge within in-
teractions in the pedagogical community. (p. 181)
Hence, there is no topic without individuals who engage and define that 
subject through language.  Yet that language functions through a dynamic be-
tween the knower and the known does not mean that we can see the specific role 
language plays in that dynamic; we do not see the dynamic between thought and 
language.
The Inseparability of Thinking and Language
 Toward understanding that language-thought dynamic, Freire and Mace-
do (1987) offer some insight when discussing literacy, the crux of which comes 
down to a fusion of the “two” acts:
The knowledge of earlier knowledge, gained by the learners as a result 
of analyzing praxis in its social context, opens to them the possibility 
of a new knowledge.  The new knowledge reveals the reason for being 
that is behind the fact, thus demythologizing the false interpretations of 
these same facts.  Thus, there is no longer any separation between thought-
language and objective reality [emphasis added].  (p. 157)
Although Freire and Macedo are speaking to the point of how knowledge 
comes to be accepted as knowledge, the essential point here concerns their confla-
tion of thought and language into the singularity of “thought-language.”  Their 
advocacy for that singularity offers two critical clues into how critical theory de-
fines reasoning:  First, it affirms Giroux and McLaren’s social constructed view of 
the world.  Although on face value, Freire and Macedo’s use of the term “objective 
reality” suggests a positivistic view of reality, that face value understanding is a red 
herring.  Examining the sentence more closely reveals that the authors conflate 
“thought-language” and “objective reality” into a singular element, therefore sig-
nifying that “objective” reality only emerges from the linguistic cognition of the 
“self.”  Reality is, for all intents and purposes, a construct.
 Aside from affirming reality as a construct, the second way the “thought-
language” singularity clues us into how critical theory views reasoning is that 
critical theorists cannot separate the “two” at all.  In other words, the fact that it is 
a singularity means that Freire and Macedo cannot articulate the former without 
the latter.  Though they hyphenate the two terms, they offer only a typographical 
distinction between them, not a functional one.  
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 Freire (1987) does this again in Pedagogy of the Oppressed by stating that 
our “object of investigation is not people … but rather the thought-language with 
which people refer to reality” (p. 91). And we see the same conflation when Giroux 
and McLaren (2012) assert that “experience is largely understood through lan-
guage” (p. 16), with the implication being that there can be little cognition—the 
“understood”—without language.  While that initial statement seems to suggest 
that some cognition can pre-exist language, they quickly go on to erase that sepa-
ration by stating that “experience is constituted by language” [emphasis added] (p. 
16).  For Giroux and McLaren, therefore, understanding the experience through 
linguistic conceptualization is the experience itself, and we cannot identify any 
experience otherwise.  And since naming (language) is the same as understanding 
(cognition), Giroux and McLaren just as easily could have said that “experience is 
constituted by thought-language,” thus returning us to Freire’s conflation of the 
terms.   
 In one seeming point of contrast to the singularity, Freire said that “[o]ur 
task is not to teach students to think—they already think; but, to exchange our 
ways of thinking with each other and look together for better ways of approaching 
the decodification of an object” (as cited in Frankenstein, 1992, p. 246).  Such 
a distinction between thinking about an object and the object itself seems to 
contradict earlier notions of “thought-language” as one.  Yet a closer unpacking 
suggests that Freire’s initial use of “think” does not refer to a cognitive process of 
reasoning but rather to raw cognitive ability, i.e. intellect.   The latter half of the 
statement, by contrast, refers to “better ways” to reason.  In fact, considering the 
importance Freire places on “exchang[ing] ways of thinking with each other,” it 
seems accurate to interpret his statement as suggesting that students already pos-
sess intellect but lack the means of reasoning, i.e. discourse.  This returns us to the 
inseparability of thinking and language.  
 Given that inseparability, it is no wonder that critical theorists hold lan-
guage use in such esteem, such as in the classic distinction between the “bank-
ing” and “problem posing” education.  In the former, “the teacher thinks and 
the students are thought about.”  Why?  Because it is in “the banking notion of 
consciousness that the educator’s role is to regulate the way the world ‘enters into’ 
the students. . . . And since people ‘receive’ the world as passive entities, educa-
tion should make them more passive still” (Freire, 1987, p. 57).  That passivity 
comes not only because teachers positively “know” the world, but also because 
they communicate that knowledge to students by filling students with pre-formed 
language, thus depriving students of the ability to linguistically interact with the 
world themselves.
 Following the same logic, Shor (1992) points more directly to language 
use as a requisite of education, stating that the banking method “represents [stu-
dents] as deficient, devoid of culture and language, needing to be filled with of-
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ficial knowledge” (p. 32).  As he articulates it, the essential problem with the 
banking method comes in how it approaches students as “devoid of … language,” 
which leaves them (a) unable to name the world themselves and (b) at the will of 
whatever language comes to them from their “teachers.”  A close read of Schor’s 
statement about banking education therefore establishes a clear distinction be-
tween the exercise of language, which simultaneously involves thinking, i.e. lan-
guage-thought, and the ingestion of language as a passive act, i.e. banking.
Withholding Language Therefore Suppresses Thinking
 With language use and thinking therefore intertwined, perhaps the deep-
er interrelationship between the “two” forces can become more apparent through 
Freire’s (1987) contention that “it is necessary to trust in the oppressed and in 
their ability to reason.  Whoever lacks this trust will fail to initiate (or will aban-
don) dialogue, reflection, and communication, and will fall into using slogans, 
communiqués, monologues, and instructions.  Superficial conversations to the 
cause of liberation carry danger” (p. 48).  Like Shor, Freire considers language—
“dialogue, reflection, and communication”—as the operative force by which edu-
cators will help humanize students or the force by which teachers will dehumanize 
them through canned instruction—“slogans, communiqués, monologues.”  
Yet Freire’s passage also points to a more insidious function of language in ed-
ucation.  Before educators choose between languaging-at-students (monologue) 
vs. languaging-with-students (dialogue), they get to language-about-students, i.e. 
label them as capable of reasoning and exercising language or not capable of rea-
soning and exercising language.  Students labeled incapable of reasoning will not 
be reasoned with (by the teacher), thus perpetuating their inability to reason in 
the future.  Thus, the teachers’ use of thought-language about the students ulti-
mately shapes what the students do or do not become.
 This withholding of language suppresses the amount of cognition that oc-
curs.  Teachers who dehumanize students into bankable objects equally dehuman-
ize themselves by failing to engage a meaningful dialogic.  “Verbalistic lessons,” 
Freire (1987) writes in reference to non-dialogic chatter, “reading requirements, 
the methods for evaluating ‘knowledge,’ the distance between the teacher and 
the taught, the criteria for promotion: everything in this ready-to-wear approach 
serves to obviate thinking” (p. 57).  Thus, “verbalistic lessons”—empty banking 
uses of language which stand in contrast to a genuine critical dialogic—prevent 
teachers from reasoning just as much it prevents their students from doing so. 
Absent of genuine language use, the teacher assumes a position of static, positivist 
knowledge and “obviate[s]” his or her own “thinking” about the issues at hand 
by failing to exercise thought-language.  In short, a lack of a dialogic suppresses 
thought in teacher and student alike. 
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 That suppression, as Marilyn Frankenstein (1992) asserts, ultimately re-
sults in the obfuscation of reality for all involved: the “dominant language [such 
as that spewed by anti-dialogic teachers] can distort people’s ability to know real-
ity critically” because it not only fails to represent reality, it also fails to involve 
students in thought-language construction (p. 244).  Referencing M. W. Apple, 
Frankenstein suggests that “labels used in educational settings work against the 
development of critical consciousness by mystifying the situations and relations 
which they describe” (p. 244).  To expound on Frankenstein, when students in-
gest subject matter through prefabricated teacher-language disconnected from 
subjective understanding, that dominant(ing) use of language will “mystify” them 
by keeping them detached from cognition.   Similarly, teachers who “label” stu-
dents a priori of engaging them only end up “mystify[ing]” those students as 
“smart” or “dumb” rather than engaging them through thought-language as real 
human beings.  Therefore, by adopting and espousing dominant(ing) verbalism, 
the banking teacher becomes as disconnected from reality as the students, all the 
while grinding true language-thinking to a virtual halt for all parties involved.
 In contrast, by adopting a “problem posing” methodology, the “teacher is 
no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue 
with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach” (Freire, 1987, p. 
61).  This is the true dialectic of which Freire speaks, one in which knowledge 
“emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impa-
tient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the 
world, and with each other” (1987, p. 53).  Contrasting this against the positivist, 
banking method, we find a world of knowledge constructed through the act of 
exercising language-thought “with each other” rather than as a static reality to be 
ingested.  
Language-thought is not an act but a state: Consciousness.
Yet what proves essential in understanding how critical pedagogues character-
ize thinking is that the dialogic is not merely an activity in which we engage, as in 
dialoguing with students or not, but rather a state of existence.  As Giroux (1984) 
writes, it is “a critical mode of reasoning and behavior” (p. 114), thus pointing 
to it not as something we do but rather as an expression of a state of being, i.e. 
“behavior.”  As behaviors are externalized expressions of internalized “subjective 
positions,” we are not beings capable of reasoning but reasoning-beings, and given 
previous discussion of the connection between cognition and language, our “be-
ingness” is contingent on the presence of language-thinking.
 Building on that contingency of “beingness,” Freire identifies three levels 
of consciousness, the lowest level of which includes people “with the most domi-
nated, ‘semi-transitive’ consciousnesses [who] have a fragmented, localized aware-
ness of their situation and are unable to think [emphasis added] dialectically about 
meaning making and making meaning meaningful | Pearlman | 107
it” (Frankenstein, 1992, p. 241).  In a banking pedagogy, for example, students 
receive fragmented, decontextualized pieces of information with which they can-
not interact dialectically.  We equally could consider such information localized 
in that it does not exist in the context of the students’ world, but rather remains 
contextual only to the academic institution.  Students learning about history in 
this semi-transitive model receive only pre-selected pieces of history that carry 
meaning only pertinent to succeeding in history class itself.  
 One step up from semi-transitive consciousness, those “living in more 
open societies naturally develop ‘naïve transitive’ consciousness where they begin 
to see causes in a broader context, but are still convinced that ‘causality is a static, 
established fact’” (Frankenstein, 1992, p. 241).  Consequently, they are not sus-
ceptible to change through their actions. Continuing the history class example, 
naïve transitive students might recognize some greater implications of the history 
lessons and connect those lessons to the modern world, perhaps facilitated by 
the teacher’s pedagogy, but still view that history as something apart from them, 
something they can play no role in constructing or interpreting, something to 
be learned through ingestion rather than something about which to construct 
understanding.  Such history also would “mystify” them because it would be pre-
selected by the teacher rather than emerging from the dialectic, and the amount 
of actual thinking would remain minimal.
 Both semi-transitive and naïve transitive consciousnesses fall well short 
of what critical pedagogues consider true critical consciousness.  As Shor (1992) 
writes:
In education, critically conscious teachers and students synthesize person-
al and social meanings with a specific theme, text, or issue.  The problem 
of literacy, for example, is addressed in a context related to the everyday 
life and language of students.  History and literature are studied in rela-
tion to student autobiography.  Science is contextualized inside student 
experience and in relation to power and problems in society.  A class for 
critical consciousness explores the historical context out of which knowl-
edge has emerged and its relation to the current social context. It suggests 
that people can learn what they need to know to act transformatively on 
the conditions they discover in school and society.  (p. 129)  
Consciousness, which we saw to be a manifestation of language-thought, only 
emerges through participation in the construction of reality, which occurs through 
a conflation of “external” topics and our subjective selves.  Or rather as Shor 
points out, topics are “contextualized inside student experience”—there is no 
topic apart from student experience of “it.”  
 Returning, therefore, to the connection between thinking, language, and 
consciousness, consciousness is not something we can do; we cannot be conscious 
about subject matter.  Rather, consciousness begets subject matter.  Consciouness, 
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to return to Giroux’s word, is “behavior.”  We behave consciously or not.   We are 
conscious or we are not.  Or as Freire (1987) puts it, “consciousness and world are 
simultaneous” (p. 62).  
 Reaffirming language’s essential role in consciousness, it is not just “con-
sciousness and [the] world [that] are simultaneous.” Rather, as consciousness is only 
constructed through the language then consciousness and word are also simultaneous. 
Or, to quote Freire’s and Macedo’s (1987) famous maxim, “[r]eading the world al-
ways precedes reading the word, and reading the word implies continually reading 
the world” (p. 35).   Therefore, it might appear as though critical theory defines 
reasoning as consciousness that emerges through dialogic interaction with the 
world through the word.  
However, just when that resolution seems near, it is at this point that the 
connection between language and thought in critical theory becomes even more 
tenuous.  First, Freire’s notion that reading the world “precedes” the word be-
comes troubling in that it implies that consciousness pre-exists language, i.e. that 
we can be conscious of the world without the word.  And while it might seem as 
though Freire and Macedo (1987) use the “reading the word” literally—referring 
strictly to the act of literacy itself rather than to the more general act of using 
language—they clarify that point when stating that “even the spoken word flows 
from our reading of the world” (p. 35).  Thus, in seeming contradiction to his 
previous statements concerning the singularity of language-thought, Freire seems 
to establish world consciousness as existing prior to word consciousness.  
 Freire and Macedo (1987) continue on to explain that “reading the word 
is not preceded merely by reading the world, but by a certain form of writing it 
or rewriting it, that is, of transforming it by means of conscious, practical work” 
(p. 35).  This produces more questions:  How can we “read the world” prior to 
the “spoken word,” much less the written one?  How can we write and rewrite the 
world without the (spoken or written) word?  And most troubling, how can we 
have conscious effect on the world without the word?  
 To all three questions, Frankenstein (1992) offers some insight, noting 
that literacy “becomes an important part of a liberatory curriculum because read-
ing enables people to gain distance from the concrete immediacies of their every-
day lives in order to understand more clearly how their lives are shaped by and in 
turn can shape the world” (p. 244).  In other words, language (literacy) allows us 
to look upon our “selves,” our “realities.”  Returning then to Freire, we can under-
stand his placement of world before word as an acknowledgment that our lives do 
involve “concrete immediacies”—direct, moment-to-moment interactions with a 
physical something, i.e. the world.  But such interaction occurs at one of the three 
levels of consciousness discussed earlier, and those levels of consciousness about 
the “concrete immediacies” determine our “distance” from it, i.e. how much per-
spective we gain on our own circumstance and how aware we are of our place 
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within the greater social construct.  In this way, reading the world does precede 
reading the word insofar as we exist with “concrete immediacies,” but consciousness 
about the world emerges only through language-thought; only language offers us 
“distance” through which to reflect back on the world consciously.   
Consciousness requires the linguistic distance to reflect on the “self”
 This reflective “distance” will prove essential to understanding reasoning 
in critical theory, which, as Shor begins to elucidate, involves a “critical posture 
towards the construction of the self in society” (Buffington and Moneyhun, 1997, 
p. 16).  Breaking Shor’s statement down, we see that it delineates between two 
different selves.  The first and more obvious one is the “self in society.”  However, 
if we are to hold a “critical posture towards” the self, then there must a something 
that holds that critical posture.  Therefore, the second and less obvious self is the 
self that adopts the “critical posture towards” the “self in society.”
 How can a self reflect on a self?  Through consciousness.  Through dis-
tance.  It is only the conscious self that can reflect on the self that exists within the 
“concrete immediacies” of existence.    In fact, Wardekker and Miedema (1997) 
reinforce Shor’s distinction between the self within and a self that is self-aware: 
“[b]esides the acquisition of competencies, [education] asks for the development 
of personal identity: being aware of yourself as a continuously judging and acting 
person.  Without this awareness, rational activity is unthinkable” (p. 56).  As did 
Shor, they see reflection on the self as the essential element of a liberating peda-
gogy for without such self-awareness “rational activity” or cognitively conscious 
action remains “unthinkable.”
 With the thought-language distinction and self-aware subjectivity as 
foreground, we can begin now to understand the essential relationship between 
language and thought in critical pedagogy.  Critical pedagogues appear to define 
cognitive consciousness as the behavior of putting language to the world rather 
than non-reflectively existing within the “concrete immediacies.”  
 Yet for critical pedagogues, cognitive consciousness involves more than 
languaging about the world and the self.  Returning to Giroux and McLaren’s 
(1987) point that “language constitutes reality rather than merely reflecting,” true 
awareness of the world and self requires more than awareness about the world; 
we cannot just use the word, we have to be aware of our use of the word.  Use of 
the word can occur even within semi-transitive consciousness, e.g. students who 
regurgitate the teacher’s words back to the teacher.  But awareness of our use of the 
word and how that constructs reality is something quite different, something that 
moves us much closer to understanding thinking in the context of critical theory.
 For Shor and Freire (1987), therefore, true consciousness occurs only 
through two means, both of which he outlines below:
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To the extent that we … communicate to each other as we become more 
able to transform our reality, we are able to know that we know; which is 
something more than just knowing. . . . We human beings know also that 
we don’t know.  Through dialogue, together on what we know and don’t 
know, we can then act critically to transform reality. (pp. 98-99) 
Speaking then to the first criterion—that we “know that we know”—it is not 
enough to just to know because knowing—exercising thought-language—does 
not represent true critical consciousness.  Instead, critical consciousness requires 
that we “know that we know,” that we are conscious of our consciousness, aware of 
our self-awareness, and reflective about how our exercise of language subjectively 
constitutes reality itself, none of which could be possible without the dialectic.  
 Nor does merely using language make it possible to “know also that we 
don’t know,” which Freire evidently holds in equal regard to knowing the known, 
because knowing that we do or do not know represent two sides of the same pro-
verbial coin.  We cannot possess awareness of our knowledge without intrinsically 
and simultaneously recognizing its boundaries, without understanding the limita-
tions of our awareness and thinking.  
  Yet that dualistic construct—knowing and not-knowing—emerge only 
through the exercise of language because, to quote S. I. Hawayakawa (1990), 
the defining element of advanced language use is that “language can be about 
language” (p. 6).  Words can be about words, and through words our thoughts 
can be about thoughts, and the “self ” can reflect on the “self.”  Whereas those in 
Freire’s semi-transitive state equate language about the world with the positivist 
world itself, e.g.  “apple” the word is essentially apple the thing, those who are 
critically conscious recognize that the language construct can be about the lan-
guage construct, e.g. we can reflect on how we define the word-thing “apple.”  An 
in the truer actuality of critical consciousness, language is never about anything 
but language itself. 
 Freire (1897) sums it up as follows:
In the process of decoding [breaking down codifications], the partici-
pants externalize their thematics and thereby make explicit their ‘real 
conscious’ of the world.  As they do this they begin to see how they 
themselves acted while actually experiencing the situation they are now 
analyzing, and thus reach a ‘perception of their previous perception. . . 
. By stimulating ‘perception of the previous perception’ and ‘knowledge 
of the previous knowledge,’ decoding stimulates the appearance of a new 
perception and the development of new knowledge. (p. 96)
This represents the true power of the dialogic and the crux of the relationship 
between language and cognition in critical pedagogy.  Critical consciousness does 
not just grant the power to name the world; it grants the power to know that we 
are naming it and how we are naming it.  The relationship between language and 
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thought is not really a thought-language conflation.  Rather, true critical conscious-
ness emerges only when thought-language is recognized to be about thought-language. 
 We not only can name the world, we can give name to our naming.  Put 
another way, we not only can be aware that we are self-aware, we can be self-aware 
about the ways in which we construct awareness.  As Giroux and McLaren (1992) 
express it:  “What makes literacy ‘critical’ is its ability to make the learner aware 
of how relations of power, institutional structures, and models of representation 
work on and through the learner’s mind ... a critical perspective demands that the 
very ideological process of language itself be interrogated” (p. 18).
 Thus, while the use of language is tied to thought and consciousness, 
the use of language about language—knowing that we know—is tied to critical 
consciousness, or more to the point, to critical reasoning.  Thinking, as an act of 
consciousness, “demands that the very ideological process of language itself be 
interrogated.”
Thinking is transformatively using language about language
 We must remember, however, that Freire included the ability “to act crti-
cally to transform reality” as an equally essential element of true critical conscious-
ness.  Indeed, a consistent theme amongst critical pedagogues is that becoming a 
truly conscious being means more than just naming the world and, indeed, even 
more than knowing that we are naming the world; critical consciousness equally 
involves participation in the transformation of the world.
 Initially, this appears to be a relatively simple idea.  Freire (1987) writes 
that “there is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis.  Thus, to speak 
a true word is to transform the world” (p. 68).  As the world is a construct of 
the word, any self-aware exercise of thought-language changes the nature of the 
world, even if only for the one person doing the naming.  By contrast, inauthentic 
words might be those that are abstracted from individual reality and “mystify,” 
and/or those deposited from a teacher.  They lack authentic, actionable power and 
thus cannot be transformative.
 “On the other hand,” Freire writes, “if action is emphasized exclusively, 
to the detriment of reflection, the word is converted into activism.  The latter—
action for action’s sake—negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible” 
(1987, p. 69).  We see, therefore, that words must emerge genuinely, neither out 
of a desire to produce action nor a desire to produce verbiage.  Instead, they must 
emerge from a genuine dialogic with self, other, and the world.  
 While Freire (1987) points out that “critical reflection [as in an internal 
dialogic] is also action” insofar as it it transforms the self (p. 109), true praxis is 
more accurately the interaction of the two.  Frankenstein (1992) defines praxis as 
“reflection and action dialectically interacting to re-create reality” (p. 317). Given 
Frankentstein’s and Freire’s points, true critical consciousness, and true reasoning 
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in the critical context, exists in the dialect between reflecting and acting, or as van 
Manen situates it, “in connections between doing and being” (as cited in Gabel, 
2002, p. 178).  This returns us to Giroux and McLaren’s characterization of the 
self as a “subjectivity”—“individual presence without essence.”
   Without essence but always dialogic, the critically conscious subjective 
self is determined not only through thought-language but also through action. 
As the unauthentic word does not represent true cognitive consciousness, and as 
words gain authenticity only when manifesting transformative power, we there-
fore gain real critical consciousness—we are only really thinking—when shaping 
the world through language and action: praxis.  In other words, if we cannot be 
said to be interacting with the world, if in giving name to it we have no effect on 
it, then we equally cannot be said to be fully conscious because the reality then re-
mains separate from our selves in the sense that it is neither affected by the self nor 
is the self affected by it.  For better or worse, knowing that we know is not enough 
because knowledge itself, if unactionable, cannot be said to be authentic knowl-
edge at all.  Thinking in language or about language without praxis is verbalism. 
Consciousness, therefore, is the self-aware self ’s interaction with the world through the 
word.
 With that understood, we find that language and cognition in critical 
pedagogy can be separated from the thought-language construct insofar is know-
ing that we know is not just thought-language but rather thought-language about 
thought-language, or, to return to Berthoff’s definition, “consciousness of con-
sciousness.”    
 The reason that kind of reasoning holds such importance in Berthoff’s 
view (and this author’s as well), is that it is awareness of self-awareness that per-
mits us to step back from our subjective selves and recognize our place in the 
world, which in turn permits actionable reflection—praxis—and thus true con-
sciousness.  Consequently, while we can make some meaning of the word by 
reading the world, that meaning—understanding—will not be meaningful until 
the word acts on the world and the world acts on the word.  In this way, critical 
theory advocates for reasoning that is not just active but rather action in itself.  
 Supposing, therefore, that we successfully define critical theory’s view of 
reasoning as self-aware self ’s interaction with the world through the word, subse-
quent questions emerge: Does critical pedagogy, e.g. problem posing education, 
ultimately foster the kind of self-aware self that we need in order to truly trans-
form the individual (and the world)?  It is one thing to foster dialogue, but to 
what extent to the fostering of dialogue actually produce self-awareness?  And if 
we suppose the self-aware self to be the goal, how can we measure its develop-
ment?  As critical pedagogues, we need to address such questions if we are to af-
firm those pedagogies that truly liberate.
meaning making and making meaning meaningful | Pearlman | 113
REFERENCES
Bertoff, A. E. (1981). The making of meaning: Metaphors, models, and maxims for 
writing teachers. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook-Heinemann.
Buffington, N. & Moneyhun, C. (1997). A conversation with Gerald Graff and 
Ira Shor. The Journal of Advanced Composition, 17(1), 1-21.
Frankenstein, M.  (1992).  Critical mathematics education: An application of 
Paulo Freire’s epistemology.  In C. M. K. Weiler (Ed.), What schools can do 
(pp. 236-263).  Albany, NY: SUNY press.
Freire, P. (1987).  Pedagogy of the oppressed. (Myra Bergman Ramos, Trans.). New 
York: Continuum.
Freire, P., & Macedo, D.  (1987).  Literacies: reading the word and the world. Mas-
sachusetts: Bergin and Garvey.
Gabel, S.  (2002).  Some conceptual problems with critical pedagogy.  Curriculum 
Inquiry, 32(2), 177-201.
Giroux, H. (1984).  Ideology, culture, and the process of schooling.  Philadelphia: 
Temple UP.
Giroux, H., and McLaren, P. (1992).  Writing from the margins: geographies of 
identity, pedagogy, and power.  Journal of Education, 174(1), 7-30.
Hairston, M.  (1992).  Diversity, ideology, and teaching writing.  College Composi-
tion and Communication, 43(2): 179-193.
Hayakawa, S. I., & Hayakawa, A.  (1990).  Language in thought and action.  New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.
McComiskey, B.  (1993).  Postmodern cultural studies and the politics of writing 
instruction.  Teaching English in the Two-Year College 26(2), 144-153.
Shor, I.  (1992).  Empowering education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shor, I., & Freire, P.  (1987).  A pedagogy for liberation: dialogues on transformative 
education.  Wesport: Greenwood, Bergin-Garvey.
Wardekker, W. & Miedema, S.  (1997).  Critical pedagogy: an evaluation and a 
direction for reformulation.  Curriculum Inquiry, 27(1), 45-61.
